Bank clearings have long been regarded as one of the most valuable indices of the volume of commercial transactions had during a given period.1 Implicit in this is recognition of the fact that payments, where more than a few dollars are involved, are today almost universally made by check. It is, of course, recognized, however, that such statistics contain an element of unreliability in that an increase in amount may be accounted for, at least in part, by a greater use of bank deposits, as well as by reason of a greater amount of business done. The movement to popularize the "trade acceptance" 2 as an instrument to displace the open book account has no doubt contributed to the increase in volume of bank clearings, but without occasioning a corresponding increase in commercial transactions.
lished, still the effect of the clause was to adopt the Massachusetts rule so that the Federal Reserve Bank as agent of the depositor could be held directly responsible. The Supreme Court decision for the defendant was given on grounds not discussed by the lower court, Justice Stone saying: ". . . when paper is indorsed without restriction by a depositor, and is at once passed to his credit by the bank to which he delivers it, he becomes the creditor of the bank; the bank becomes owner of the paper, and in making the collection is not the agent for the depositor."
It is interesting to note that in reaching this result the court cited no case which had had before it the precise question involved in the Douglas case, although several cases were cited which for other purposes had ruled that the bank of deposit should be regarded as a "purchaser." The court apparently rested the case principally on the authority of Burton v. United States,15 which was cited several times. Here the question before the court was whether an indictment of Senator Burton charging him with having received payment in St. Louis for services rendered before the United States Post Office Department could be sustained upon the evidence. It was admitted that the services had been rendered and that payment had been receivedbut payment was in the form of checks drawn upon the Commonwealth Trust Company of St. Louis, and were deposited by Senator Burton in the Riggs National Bank of Washington, D. C. The Riggs National gave credit for the amount immediately and, as testified by the cashier, this gave the depositor the privilege of drawing at once for the full amount. In this setting the court ruled that the check when deposited belonged to the Riggs Bank, so that payment was made to it and not to Senator Burton in St. Louis. The evidence was therefore held not to support the indictment. The Riggs bank was a "purchaser," not an "agent."'6
The court in the Burton case did not appear to have made any extensive investigation of the various incidents of such a deposit, but relied almost exclusively on the language of prior cases in which the transaction was described as a "purchase," although in none was the purpose at issue in any way comparable to that involved in the Burton case. The three leading cases cited deserve special notice. The most recent was that of Taft v. Quinsigamond National Bank,17 decided six years before in Massachusetts. The controversy there was between the deposit5 196 U. S. 283, 25 Sup. Ct. 243 (1905) . 16 It is amazing the influence the Burton case has had on subsequent litigation involving purely banking questions. The real issue in the Burton case was primarily one as to how strictly the penal statute in the case should be enforced.
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tor and the bank of deposit, the Quinsigamond National Bank of Worcester, Massachusetts. The deposit was of a check drawn on a bank located in Edgemont, South Dakota, and payable to the plaintiff. The latter's account was credited on August 2, 1897, when the item was deposited. It appears that the item was promptly sent forward for collection, but the defendant's correspondent sent the item directly to the drawee in Edgemont. No word of its fate was received by the defendant until September 8, 1897. Then, after some endeavor to effect collection, the defendant on November 19, 1897 charged the amount back to the plaintiff when writing up his passbook. Upon these facts the court held that "when, without more, a bank receives upon deposit a check indorsed without restriction, and gives credit for it to the depositor as cash in a drawing account, the form of the transaction is consistent with and indicates a sale, in which, as with money so deposited, the check becomes the absolute property of the banker." The court mentioned, as being consistent with this view but not necessitating the result, that the depositor had been allowed to draw against the credit. Thus the court reached the conclusion that the defendant having purchased the item did not have the power to reverse the transaction. The court cited no authority at all in point for this proposition.18 The next earlier case relied upon by the court in the Burton case was that of Metropolitan National Bank v. Loyd.l9 This also involved a deposit of a demand item, but again the question before the court was entirely different from that in any of the preceding cases. On October 29, 1878, Murray deposited with the Merchants & Mechanics Bank of Troy, N. Y. a check for $305 drawn to his order by the defendant. The check, which had been properly indorsed, was credited to Murray's account in his passbook and was then mailed on the same day to the plaintiff, duly indorsed, by the Merchants & Mechanics Bank, for credit to its account, which was at the time overdrawn.
18 In Heinrich v. First National Bank, 219 N. Y. 1, 113 N. E. 531 (1916), a similar case, the deposited check having remained unpresented for some ten months while reposing behind a radiator in a Philadelphia Post Office, the bank was also refused the privilege of charging the amount of the credit back to its customer.
In the words of Judge Cardozo, "The defendant has suffered loss because checks which it was collecting in its own behalf, as owner and not as agent, miscarried in the mails, and because after notice of the mishap, it slept upon its rights." Accord, although here too the bank showed a practice of giving immediate credit to the depositor in his checking account under circumstances allowing of charge back in case of dishonor. Murray appears to have learned of the failure of the Merchants & Mechanics Bank before the item was presented for payment and to have had payment stopped. It was argued that the credit given to the defendant was only provisional and that the Merchants & Mechanics Bank was merely an agent with no authority to sell the item to the plaintiff. The court ruled, however, that when the bank gave Murray credit for the deposit, "the property in the check passed from Murray and rested in the bank. He was entitled to draw the money so credited to him, for as to it the relation of debtor and creditor was formed, and the right of Murray to command payment at once was of the very essence and nature of the transaction."
No evidence appears to have been introduced to show that drawing would actually have been allowed as stated by the court.
The Metropolitan Bank case was like each of the foregoing in citing no authority squarely in point,20 but equally happy in having urged upon it prior cases where for other purposes the banker was deemed an owner of his customer's deposits. Among these, the case of Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank,21 relied upon in the Burton case, should be considered. The Fulton Bank of New York in 1861 sent a collection to the Marine Bank of Chicago and, owing to the disturbed state of the currency at the time, authorized receipt of payment in Illinois bills, the same to be retained by the Marine Bank as a deposit. This was done. Illinois currency depreciated and the Fulton Bank, upon drawing against the deposit some months later, was offered payment in Illinois bills. It was held, however, to be entitled to payment in legal tender in an amount equal to the dollar value of the deposit on the day the account was credited. The court stated that upon crediting the Fulton Bank under the circumstances the relationship of debtor and creditor arose and, further, that although the Illinois currency had depreciated it was money belonging to the Marine Bank and in which the Fulton Bank was in no way interested.
The Marine Bank case 22 serves to point a transition from the 20 Principal reliance was put on earlier insurance and brokerage cases. In Scott v. Ocean Bank, 23 N. Y. 289 (1861), an insurance company occupied the position of bank of deposit and as it did not appear to have given the depositor credit for the item it was held the transferee was not entitled to retain the proceeds. A prior case, Clark v. Merchants Bank, 2 N. Y. 380 (1849), involved a deposit with brokers who in turn delivered the item to the defendant which collected it and applied the proceeds to a pre-existing debt of the brokers after their insolvency. Here apparently the customer had received credit with authority to draw and judgment was for the defendant. many cases, of which Foley v. Hill 23 is perhaps best known, where for one purpose or another the relation of depositor and bank has been described as that of debtor and creditor; a generality as to which there appears to be no dissent. From this to holding that the bank of deposit should suffer any depreciation in the particular moneys received, as in the Marine Bank case, was but a step, or perhaps logically only a necessary implication of that holding. The next step, that of saying that the debtorcreditor notion should apply to deposits of demand paper-that the bank was a "purchaser"-was a step of greater length. The Metropolitan Bank case has been criticized as using the purchase idea as a mere device to avoid the rule obtaining in New York at the time that a pre-existing debt would not constitute value.24 While superficially this is plausible, still it would seem unlikely that the foregoing series of cases would be based on anything so tenuous. It is clear, though, that the court in the Metropolitan Bank case did not have in support of its position any prior banking authority which had gone so far.
Granting for the moment that the Metropolitan Bank case may have taken new ground, still, whatever one's emotional reaction to the law may be, the foregoing series of cases must seem to the layman like a strange assortment to be regarded almost as conclusive authority for each other. Suppose the court in 1904 did refuse to sustain the indictment of Senator Burton, saying that the Riggs National had "purchased" the check he deposited with it. Is that to be almost controlling authority for the holding in the Douglas case that the City of Douglas should have no cause of action as depositor against a correspondent collecting agent, or that Rochling should or should not be allowed a preferred claim upon the insolvency of Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne? And is it to be taken more or less for granted that the banking practice prevailing in Douglas, Arizona, in 1920 was the same as the practice of the Merchants and Mechanics Bank of Troy, New York, in 1878, or of the Quinsigamond National Bank in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1897? Perhaps-but it is doubtful that either consideration is given much weight. On the other hand, while this use of authority may well be subject to criticism, still the actual decisions in each case may be satisfactory. To ascertain this would require a detailed examination into all phases of the subject from the practical viewpoint. An inquiry deposits of coin made with the Riggs bank in 1861 were likewise not repayable in kind, but, as the relation was merely a general debtor-creditor one, the bank could pay in green backs, legal tender.
23 2 H. L. Cas. 28 (1848). Here it was announced that the relation between bank and depositor is that of debtor and creditor, the issue before the court though was merely whether a depositor would be entitled to an accounting in equity.
into some of the cases wherein special facts have been urged upon the courts as varying the situation, or in which different issues have been raised, should assist, however, in a determination.
The issue may be presented graphically by visualizing a daily window deposit. Money and bills are, of course, entered in the passbook as cash, but, without any inquiry whatever as to the financial standing of the parties, checks also are credited to the account. According to the legal view of the transaction above set forth, the bank is regarded as having become a purchaser at this point. On the same day, however, should the customer wish to sell to the bank his notes or trade acceptances evidencing business receivables, it would usually be necessary to confer with one of the superior officers of the bank, and much information as to the customer's financial standing, the transactions out of which the items grew and the worth of the other parties to the instruments offered would no doubt be required. And even then credit would not ordinarily be given for the face value, but for face less discount. While, of course, this procedure applies particularly to unmatured time items, demand drafts on out-of-town points, which may be compared with checks drawn on the same points, may be discounted in the same way. In fact, in many cases such items would only be taken as collateral, the customer being required to sign a note for the principal sum, usually less than the value of the collateral. Of course, in either case the proceeds would be carried to the drawing account. But why make the sharp difference in practice if in legal effect the ordinary deposit results in a "purchase"?
Apparently, substantially the foregoing argument was made to the court in the Metropolitan Bank case,25 but the court brushed it aside by merely asserting that in fact what the parties had done, as clearly as if it were the result of a formal application for discount, was to "transfer the title" to the check and the bank "charged itself with a debt absolutely due" the depositor. On what were very similar facts, in so far as they were reported in the two cases, This argument is plausible-but it would apply equally to deposits of money or to checks "cashed" rather than received on deposit by the teller. In such cases it is well established that the bank is to be regarded as owner.
The setting of the case before the Kentucky court was quite different from that in the Metropolitan Bank case, which may perhaps explain the difference in viewpoint. In the Kentucky case the plaintiff had deposited with the defendant a check drawn on an out-of-town bank and received immediate credit with the privilege of drawing if desired. There was evidence of a custom on the part of the bank to charge back uncollected items. Here, however, the check was duly paid, loss occurring through failure of a correspondent to remit the proceeds. The plaintiff contended, as was held in the Taft case,27 that the bank was a "purchaser" and must bear the loss. Obviously, the item having been paid, the bank had no recourse against its depositor upon his indorsement. But without considering the extent of legal sanction to be given to the charge-back custom, the court decided that the bank was acting merely as "agent" for transmission rather than as "purchaser," and thus reached the result that it was not responsible.28
It is apparent from the foregoing that the "purchase" theory when adopted forecloses all discussion of whether the bank of deposit is to be regarded as a collecting agent responsible for acts of its sub-agents, the New York collection rule, or as being an agent for transmission of the paper to proper correspondents, the so-called Massachusetts rule.29 In the Falls City case, the court, after refusing the purchase view, applied the Massachusetts collection rule obtaining in Kentucky to reach its result of non-responsibility on the part of the bank of deposit. In the Kirkham case,30 arising in New York, a case very similar upon its facts, it was decided not only that the bank as "purchaser" should be responsible to its depositor but, without much discrimination, also apparently that the result might be justified on the theory that the New York bank of deposit as collecting agent was responsible for the acts of its correspondent.
On these limited facts this precise question arises much less often today because of the widespread use by banks of stipula- It appears to have been designed primarily to circumvent the New York collection rule and did so by stipulating for the Massachusetts rule. It is obvious, however, that if given effect according to its literal wording it would constitute a stipulation against the "purchase" notion as well, the relation being defined as one of "agency" instead.3 Indeed, the court in the Taft case, while holding the bank responsible on the purchase theory, thus reaching the same result as though the New York collection rule had been applied, stated that had some such clause as this been used it would have been given effect.33 In states having the Massachusetts collection rule it became customary to use only a short provision, as in the Douglas case, reading: "All out-oftown items credited subject to final payment." No doubt seems to have existed in the Douglas case but that this would be effective to allow of charging an item back to the depositor. The item in the Douglas case appears, in fact, to have been charged back to the City of Douglas.
The situation of the City of Douglas after the Supreme Court decision had been rendered throws some light on the desirability of the result reached in the Douglas case. The court held that no recovery could be had against the collecting bank for its neg- ligence, there being no privity. The "charge back" by the bank of deposit presumably being sanctioned as well, the depositor was left apparently with no recovery against anyone whatever. There have been few cases going so far. In Downey v. National Exchange Bank,34 squarely in point with the Douglas case and reaching the same result, the item was charged back to the depositor, apparently pursuant to a charge back provision, although the point was not mentioned, and the court said: "When the check was returned to the bank of Arlington and was by it turned over to appellant (the depositor) and was by him accepted and charged to his account by the bank, this constituted a resale of the check to the appellant." Notwithstanding this resale, however, the court refused recovery against the correspondent, stating that there was no privity of contract between the depositor and the correspondent. deposit was of a draft with an attached bill of lading for a car of potatoes. While the bank was holding the draft the car was broken into and some of the potatoes stolen. Upon the buyer's refusal to take up the draft the item was charged back to the shipper. Near the end of the statutory period, apparently having no other recourse, the depositor commenced action in his own name against the carrier for alleged conversion. The court cited the Burton case for the proposition that the bank had become a "purchaser" when the item was deposited, and from this it moved to the position that the conversion must, therefore, have been of the bank's potatoes.37 The case is of particular interest as the court recognized that the charge back operated as an "assignment" of the bank's rights against the carrier. Nevertheless, it was held that the assignor could only sue in the name of the bank. Even if a theory of assignment is to be worked out in these cases so as to allow of suit by the depositor against correspondent banks, it has been slow developing and in the meantime many depositors have been deprived of all recovery.38 Presumably in any case, the depositor's rights as assignee would be subject to any set-off or defense good against the bank of deposit. Under pressure of this unsatisfactory situation it might be expected that courts would begin to find an "agency" where for other purposes the facts would perhaps still be described as showing a "purchase."
In while if the Massachusetts "purchase" rule had been applied, as in the Taft case, the bank of deposit would have been held responsible. All of the essential facts relied upon to show a "purchase" appeared in each case. In several other states the same result has been reached, the Massachusetts collection rule being applied.41 But in Brown v. Peoples Bank,42 the Florida court held the bank of deposit responsible to its depositor where the proceeds of the deposited item had not been received by it due to the failure of the collecting bank. These cases, if we except the Florida decision, indicate that the purchase idea is not looked upon with entire favor in the exact situation presented, that is, where the depositor sues his own bank. It would seem, also, that if the action were against the correspondent the courts deciding these cases would be fairly committed to allowing a recovery, contrary to the results of the Douglas case.
The Brown v. Peoples Bank decision was followed by legislation in Florida providing that the bank of deposit in these circumstances would "only be liable after actual payment received by it." The Supreme Court in the Malloy case,43 a decision handed down only a year or so before the decision in the Douglas case, had occasion to construe this statute in a typical purchase situation. The court, however, interpreted the statute as equivalent to the adoption of the Massachusetts collection rule and thus allowed suit to be brought against the correspondent collecting bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, for negligence in handling the item. Had the "purchase" notion been given consideration, it would seem that the court logically could no more have applied the Massachusetts collection rule than did the Massachusetts court in the Taft But it is doubtful that the statute 45 was designed to adopt a "collection" rule to the exclusion of the "purchase" rule. It would seem to have been expressly drawn to relieve the depositor's bank of responsibility for acts of its correspondents. Is such a provision fatal to the purchase notion? May not a bank be a "purchaser" and yet at the same time be held not to bear the risks incident to collection? This was exactly what was stipulated for in the Douglas case by the provision: "all out-of-town items credited subject to final payment." Of course the statute may have gone one step further; it definitely covered the contingency that even though the item should be paid, in the sense that secondary parties would be discharged, still the bank would not be responsible until the proceeds were received by it. But exactly this interpretation has been placed upon the Douglas case stipulation, that is, final payment is said to mean final payment actually made to the bank of deposit.46 It may be inferred ficance) the stipulation would serve only to exonerate it, and the next bank in the chain not using such a waiver would be deemed to have as- 45 The statute read: "That when a check, draft, note or other negotiable instrument is deposited in a bank for credit or for collection, it shall be considered due diligence on the part of the bank in the collection of any check, draft, note or other negotiable instrument so deposited, to forward and route the same without delay in the usual commercial way in use according to the regular course of business of banks, and that the maker, indorser, guarantor or surety of any check, draft, note or other negotiable instrument, so deposited, shall be liable to the bank until actual final payment is received, and that when a bank receives for collection any check, draft, note or other negotiable instrument and forwards the same for collection as herein provided, it shall only be liable after actual final payment is received by it, except in case of want of due diligence on its part as aforesaid." Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1920) ? 4748.
It would seem almost impossible to interpret this as excluding the "purchase" notion although it very carefully provides that the risks incident to collection shall be borne by the depositor.
46 "The words on the deposit slip, 'all items credited subject to final payment' mean that the credit is given subject to the final payment to the bank, and that the credit may be withdrawn if the item is not paid to the that the court in the Douglas case did not understand the provision to go so far, and possibly this may be said to be the distinction between the cases, but it is fair to say that there is no intimation in either opinion that this should be the dividing line. Whatever the accepted interpretation of "subject to final payment" may turn out to be, many banks, in the absence of legislation similar to the Florida statute, make it perfectly clear that all risks of collection up to the time when they are in receipt of payment in cash or solvent credits are to be borne by the depositor.47
Banking practice has gone a long way to reach this point. It appears that formerly it was not customary for banks to charge back unpaid items to their customer's account. The practice seems to have been to notify the depositor that his item had been dishonored and to request him to make it good. Often this was done by the depositor giving the bank his check drawn upon the account. Possibly this was too slow. At any rate the practice grew up of charging the customer's account, merely notifying him thereafter of the fact. This, by stipulation or by statute, is now sanctioned even where the item has in fact been paid, the loss occurring through the default or failure of collecting banks' remitting the proceeds. There is one limitation, and that is where the bank of deposit has itself been negligent.48 Of course, here . 1898) , where the court said that inasmuch as the bank of deposit had delayed presentment it could be held responsible whether "agent" or "purchaser." too, the result will vary depending on whether the "purchase" or the New York or Massachusetts "collection" rule obtains.49 To many courts the very idea of charging back a credit given upon a deposited item is wholly repugnant to the conception of purchase which they entertain.50 It is at the same time generally recognized that the secondary responsibility of the depositor to his bank upon the item either in his capacity as drawer or as indorser cannot well be said to conflict. And many courts have sought to reconcile the charge back practice with the idea of purchase by saying that the legal basis for reversing a credit entry of this character is simply that it is merely another means of enforcing the depositor's obligation as a secondary party.51 But it is obvious that if this is so it is a somewhat extra-legal method. Indorsees generally proceed in quite a different manner to recover of their indorsers. Furthermore, it is quite apparent that the various clauses such as "credited subject to final payment" were designed for the very purpose of allowing a charge back, say in the situation before the court in the Taft case, where, through delay on the part of the correspondent, the depositor 49 If the bank is to be regarded as in any sense an "agent" rather than a "purchaser" it will probably not be held would no doubt have been discharged on the item. Of course, the present stipulations definitely providing for charge back even though the item has in fact been paid go much beyond this limit.
It is indeed interesting to observe the attitude of the courts with respect to this changing practice. In the Metropolitan Bank case the court labeled the transaction "purchase," but gave the matter of charge back no consideration whatever. In the Douglas case, and, in this respect it is typical of those courts adhering to the "purchase" rule, the court said: "While there is not entire uniformity of opinion, the weight of authority supports the view that upon the deposit of paper unrestrictedly indorsed, and credit of the amount to the depositor's account, the bank becomes the owner of the paper, notwithstanding a custom or agreement to charge the paper back to the depositor in the event of dishonor." It cited as authority prior cases involving different issues, not one of which had had before it a stipulation similar to that in the Douglas case.
By way of further illustration, the problem may be examined from still a different angle, one involving other issues. It is customary in some lines for the seller to deposit his draft on the buyer in a bank with shipping documents attached, receiving immediate credit in his checking account. Well departmentalized banks regard this as a discount transaction as distinguished from a deposit.52 In the case of time items, particularly, it is customary to give credit only for the face amount less discount. Demand items payable out of town are often handled in the same way, the discount being calculated on the estimated time the item will require for collection, with an understanding that a further adjustment either way may be made if necessary; or possibly the face amount will be credited and a single interest charge will be made when the item's fate is determined.53 As stated earlier, however, in point of legal theory there would seem to be no distinction, for, if ordinary deposits of demand items are regarded as "purchases," all the more clearly the discount of such items, whichever method is employed, would fall in that category. And it does not appear that any court in this 52 (deposit of "on arrival" draft) the depositor was credited with face under such an interest arrangement. In the Weed case, supra note 36, the credit was apparently of face less discount. In the Ranlett case, supra, the court said, "The arrangement for interest may well have been in lieu of discountt at least, it was entirely consistent with an intention that title to the draft should pass to the claimant." country in recent years has taken any distinction in this regard between time and demand items.54
Here again the "purchase" theory receives a severe test. Altogether too often the buyer, after taking up the draft and documents, asserts a claim against the seller, usually for alleged breach of warranty, and brings suit by attaching the proceeds in the hands of the local collecting bank. The case is tried at the buyer's point. There is usually some evidence that the buyer may in fact have a bona fide claim. The intervention of the bank from a distant point claiming to be the owner of the draft may readily be made to appear before a jury as but an attempt to save the seller.55 And, as might be expected in the circumstances, many courts are far from holding, upon being shown the essential "purchase" facts, that a verdict should be directed for the intervening bank.56 Quite the contrary! The case is often submitted to the jury with results adverse to the bank. In Texas a directed verdict for the intervening bank was held error, inasmuch as the court felt that the circumstance that interest was to be charged while the item was outstanding tended to show "agency." 57 And as a matter of procedure, when the case is submitted to a jury, many courts require the bank, as intervenor, to bear the burden of the issue.58 In these cases, also, the point most damaging to the bank's position has been the charge back practice.59 Most courts, however, here also regard charge back, at least where it appears to be about the same as enforcing the depositor's responsibility as endorser, to be quite consistent with the purchase doctrine.60 There is, though, a further consideration appearing in many of these cases, and that is as to the significance which should be attached to actual drawing on the part of the depositor against the credit in his favor. In the orthodox purchase cases the power to draw has been considered to follow necessarily from immediate credit.61 In the early Metropolitan Bank case as well as in the late Rochling case, power to draw at once was assumed.62 But in the "agency" view drawing has been regarded purely as a concession which the banks might extend or not in its discretion. There is no way in the ordinary case of objectively determining in which way drawings may have been made.63 Some deposit when the attachment is filed, is remote compared with the similar possibility on the purchase theory.67 Perhaps some rule based upon the idea that first drawings are made against first credits might be developed to show that the bank's lien interest had accrued even though the account continued in funds, but it is unlikely.68 Of course on the purchase view it is immaterial what the state of the account between bank and depositor may be at the time of the attachment.69 Certainly if, as has been held,70 the attaching creditor prevails providing only it is shown that at the time of the attachment the bank could have hurried to cover by charging its depositor's account, the security afforded by this paper would be wholly illusory. It is believed that the benefits to accrue to all parties from protecting items of this character from attachment far outweigh the procedural gain to an occasional buyer found in allowing the process.71 67 It is more than probable that the intervening bank would have the burden of establishing its lien position also while, of course, if it had been viewed as a holder of the draft rather than as an agent it would be prima facie a holder for value, the instrument being negotiable. Those courts nominally following the purchase view which put the burden on the intervening bank to justify its claim to the proceeds present a strange state of affairs. While the draft is held by the discounting bank or its collecting agent it would be a presumed holder of the draft for value with the documents as collateral, but upon payment the position is exactly reversed in these courts. 68 It is interesting to compare National Bank of Commerce v. Morgan, 207 Ala. 65, 92 So. 10 (1921), an attachment case in which it was shown that at all times the depositor's account exceeded the amount of the item the proceeds of which were being garnished, although drawings to a greater amount had been allowed in the interim. The court assumed, for purposes of the case, that the purchase idea should govern and then proceeded to hold that the bank was not a holder in due course because it had given no value and from this it reached the conclusion that the attaching creditor should prevail. Strangely enough, few of the cases appear to have discussed the conflict of laws question involved. For example, in the Ferson case,72 the shipment was of hay from Kansas to North Carolina. The North Carolina court had no hesitation in taking the "agency" view, yet in Kansas, where the bank acquired the paper, the Kansas court in the case of Mercantile Co. v. Bank,~3 followed the "purchase" theory to defeat attachment, the case involving a shipment of two cars of potatoes from Oklahoma. But to carry the matter no further, it would appear from First National Bank z. Munding,7 a case concerning a shipment of grain from Arkansas to Oklahoma, that the "agency" view is followed in Oklahoma to allow of attachment. It would seem that the interest of the bank of deposit should be ascertained by the law of the place of deposit. In the principal case considering the question, that of Fourth National Bank v. Bragg,75 the Virginia court fortified its decision denying the attachment on the "purchase" theory, by citation of Alabama authority to the same effect, the shipment having originated in Alabama. No doubt if this were followed the "purchase" view would be regarded more favorably in the interest of protecting local shippers. But if the attitude of the courts in the bank collection cases76 is to serve as a guide, each court will continue to reach its own conclusion as to whether the ordinary deposit facts constitute a "purchase" or not.
Enough has been said to indicate, without in any sense purporting to exhaust the subject, that there are many considerations to be taken into account. Especially so if only one word as "purchase" or "agency" is to be used to cover satisfactorily all It would in this view perhaps be desirable to exempt such items from attachment altogether as, even on the purchase view the possibility that the bank will have to go to a distant state to establish its position is enough to make it less ready to take any paper subject to such a contingency. The real protection to the buyer should be in careful inspection before taking up the goods. Certainly the Mississippi view that the collecting bank must retain collected proceeds for a period of ninety six hours, during which apparently the buyer may decide whether or not to attach, does not tend to facilitate commerce. See Alexander County Nat. Bank v. Conner, 110 Miss. 653, 70 So. 827 (1916), a case where the collecting bank became insolvent while holding the proceeds, in which it was held the owner was not entitled to a preferred claim. the differing situations and issues brought up for decision. It is also evident that little if any consideration is being given, at least in the reported decisions, to the part such deposits play in the general financial scheme of things. The chief objective appears to be to write in successive cases, although involving wholly different issues, a self-consistent statement of the law, following the supposed implications of the descriptive terms "agency" or "purchase," depending upon which may have been first used in the state. While consistent statement has its value, it should be subservient to desirability of result. And it is at least fairly clear that the present course of decision is no more likely to result in uniformity of opinion among courts generally than it will in entirely satisfactory results in all of the various situations that come before any one court.
It is necessary in order to appreciate the difficulties of the problem before the courts to consider to some extent certain developments in banking. There have been a great many changes during the last seventy-five years. If one looks to the cases decided before the Civil War there is found almost no discussion of the problem; items were apparently received as collections.7 In fact, the practice of giving immediate credit with privilege of drawing did not arise except as banking conditions became fairly well stabilized.78 Then under the stress of competition, aided by the fact that in many cases such items when sent to city correspondents could be counted at once as reserves, the practice became general, both between city bank and country bank and between depositors and banks. Of course, as the depositor was given credit at face value, it became important for the bank of deposit to route items so that they could be collected as cheaply as possible, even though in a roundabout way. Thus items were sent to banks with which mutual account arrangements were established, each giving the other immediate credit with privilege of drawing, and handling the collection without charge.79 Much of this practice is gone. It is no longer customary for banks to maintain mutual collection accounts to any extent; collection items in the Federal Reserve System may not be counted as reserves until collected ;80 and, although the practice of giving immediate credit to depositors still obtains, it has been hedged about in many ways.
One of the abuses of the system, "kiting," 81 no doubt contributed to the present change in practice. By opening a local account and one at a distant point a depositor, who alternately deposited in one bank a check drawn on the other, could always have at his disposal without interest and without having had any actual funds, the amount of his checks. This was obviously unprofitable.
But, without kiting, something of the same sort occurs whenever drawing against uncollected items is allowed. And from the bank's standpoint it is recognized that the uses to which the paper can now be put are in many cases no longer adequate compensation.
As a consequence, some banks stipulate that drawing in such cases will not be allowed. Here a firm of brokers, which had been in the practice of maintaining fictitious balances with the plaintiff bank, deposited a check drawn by the defendant and were given immediate credit. The firm failed having less real balance in its favor than the defendant's check amounted to. It was held that the plaintiff could not be a purchaser by reason of the fact that it used the usual form of waiver reading "This bank, in receiving check or draft on deposit or for collection, acts only as your agent, and, beyond carefulness in selecting agents at other points and in forwarding to them, assumes no responsibility." The court said: "Under the contract here entered into between the bank and the brokerage concern, it is clear that the bank became the latter's agent for collection of the checks, and could not, it is needless to suggest, be the owner of the paper at the same time."
To the claim that at least the bank's lien interest should be protected the court said that this was not enforceable as the bank, having had some knowledge of the brokerage firms kiting operations, could not be said to have acted bona fide. In this connection it should also be noted that there has long been authority in the Federal courts to the effect that a bank This development, taken with the agency collection clauses stipulating for non-responsibility for acts of correspondents, and the latest model charge back provisions, would appear to deprive the immediate credit circumstance of almost all of its substance. Are we then to look forward to the probability that in future litigation the tendency will be more and more to adopt the "agency" statement of the case? As indicated above, many courts now consider the simplest charge back custom inimical to "purchase." 84 The others when faced with the newer provisions allowing charge back even though the item has been paid can no longer say they are merely enforcing the depositor's liability as indorser-and some will no doubt say "agency." Again, if "right to draw" is of the "essence" of the purchase doctrine, it might be expected, as has been held, that stipulations forbidding drawing against uncollected items bring about an "agency." 85 And many courts have read the clause stipulating for non-responsibility for collecting agents as necessarily bringing about "agency" 86 and negativing the "purchase" doctrine. It is evident that there is much future litigation in prospect.
To assist in unravelling the tangle, let us hold a short conference between the courts and the parties concerned. In the last analysis the courts are engaged in writing, piecemeal, as cases are presented, what in ultimate effect is very similar to a blanket agreement between the parties, so the conference should be pro- Whether interest is charged in advance as in the typical discount case or not until after collection would seem to be immaterial. Both would be consistent with the "purchase" view. . . " fitable. It is believed that the banker and the depositor would be fairly in accord on the proposition that the immediate credit system is, in the great majority of cases, quite satisfactory when it means what is usually understood by "purchase." Credit is given at face, there are no collection charges 87 and the responsible depositor has the privilege of immediate drawing, a credit matter of great importance to him. The bank, regarded as "purchaser," may rediscount the item, collect it through such channels and in such manner as it sees fit, and in further dealings with the depositor be protected as having already become a holder of an actual security.
In the normal case the item is paid and the transaction liquidated-a much simpler procedure than loaning against collateral-but one based on the fact that a very high percentage of such items are duly paid. Objectively, the parties no doubt would also agree that the credit to the depositor's account, made in the books of the bank or in the depositor's passbook, should be given almost conclusive significance.88
If the courts proceed from this norm, may they square with it the stipulations used by some banks refusing drawings against uncollected items, or the practice of others in charging interest against such drawings? This, to the banker, raises the loan side of the transaction.
As a rule a depositor maintains a real balance-not one made up of uncollected items. If the latter is the case, the bank must either close the account,89 shift the loss by increasing interest rates or, more equitably, require the unprofitable customer to pay for the accommodation extended. The interest practice has caused little difficulty, it being readily reconcilable with notions of "purchase."90
The clauses forbidding drawing are but another way of accomplishing the same purpose. They are of value to the bank only in the unusual 87 It has been estimated in an investigation for the Massachusetts State Legislature that the cost of collecting checks, exclusive of overhead expenses, is 1.5 cents for each check handled as a deposit and 23.7 cents for items handled as collections. PATON, DIGEST (1926) ? 1776. 88 The court in the case of In re Farrow's Bank, Ltd., supra note 82, intimated that should the bank have received the item for "collection" it could not on its own motion become a "purchaser" by merely entering it in its customer's account. In the great majority of cases, though, it may be assumed, there being nothing expressly to the contrary, that a deposited item may be so credited. The point is not discussed in the American cases. In event, however, that the entry in the depositor's pass book is of paper as, for example, "Check on First Nat. Bk. $1000," it has been held that an "agency" rather than a "purchase" is established. 90 It is interesting to note that the practice of many banks in making a small fixed charge should the depositor fail to maintain an average balance of a specified amount has never been called in question in these cases. The interest charge serves a somewhat similar purpose.
It would be preferable to disregard the terms "purchase" and "agency" altogether and recognize that a broader formula is needed to serve as a rule of decision.96 In such case there should be no difficulty in allowing a depositor to sue sub-agents for their negligence, contrary to the Douglas case,97 and yet, for example, in the garnishment cases to refuse to allow attachment by the depositor's creditors.98 While this may seem like attempting to blow both hot and cold at the same time, it is only so on the assumption that either "purchase" or "agency" as usually understood must serve as a starting point. To make such an assumption is to allow words to dictate decisions. However, it may be predicted that courts will be slow to abandon the supposition that their decisions must be restricted to a choice between either "agency" or "purchase." 99 used merely to contract out of the New York collection rule as to actual collections, was simply continued as to deposits primarily to avoid collection risks and not in order to negative the "purchase" rule.
96 The often quoted rule that the relation between bank and depositor is that of debtor and creditor, for example, while useful as a rule of decision in many cases is of course not a complete statement of the case. Supp. 1131 (1900), a garnishment case in which Judge Hiscock said: "If plaintiff discounted and thereby became the absolute owner of a draft for a customer, and the draft for any reason was not paid, it would naturally expect to charge it back to the customer's account or compel him in some way to make it good. In the case of a draft so discounted and payable in a distant city, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to utilize a line of collecting agents, and any one of them through failure or insolvency might defeat the collection of the draft and place plaintiff where it might desire to charge the same back against its customer. And as I look at it this rule (that the bank in receiving checks or drafts on deposit or for collection acted only as agent and beyond carefulness in selecting agents assumed no responsibility) was intended to cover that part of its transactions with its customers, and as to those acts to make the customer responsible and relieve the bank from liability except within the limits named by the rule." Accordingly, the bank was regarded as a purchaser and allowed to defeat the attachment. It is not as though the courts adopting the "agency" view are impelled to take that course to protect the depositor, who admittedly is in a weak bargaining position, for it does not appear to work out that way. For example, in the situation presented by the Taft case, the "agency" view relieves the bank, not the depositor, if the Massachusetts collection rule obtains, and if the New York rule, the bank's stipulations accomplish the same end. In the garnishment cases the "agency" rule clearly operates to the disadvantage of both bank and depositor.
And today, in the cases typified by the Metropolitan Bank decision, where the bank of deposit becomes insolvent after having forwarded the item to a correspondent to which it was indebted, the correspondent would prevail as holder in due course, regardless of whether the bank of deposit was "agent" or "purchaser." 100
Only in the situations typified by the Douglas and Rochling cases would the agency rule favor the depositor.
In the first of these his gain may be largely one of simplified procedure, for at least the depositor, as assignee of the purchasing bank of detions, debtor and creditor or principal and agent, are mutually exclusive and that it has been the failure to observe this which has caused the confusion in the cases.
100 The issue is presented most often in cases where the bank of deposit uses an "agency" clause and then forwards the item to a correspondent which subsequently brings suit on the item, for example against the depositor. Here if the correspondent bank gave immediate credit to the forwarding bank and allowed withdrawals, there has been no difficulty in susposit, has some possibility of recovering against sub-agent correspondent banks for their negligence. In the second, involving the contingency which the parties probably concerned themselves least about, if the bank is regarded as holding the deposited item as "agent" the depositor may be given a preferred claim.101 It is believed that this result, however well established, is essentially unfair to the other depositors, the principal creditors of the failed bank, in that it is purely fortuitous.
Other depositors may perhaps have deposited an equal amount on the day preceding the failure, but in cash. Both would have received immediate credit with the same privilege of drawing. Of course, if the depositor of the item had indorsed it restrictively with the understanding that it should be handled on a collection basis, no privilege of drawing being extended, much might be said for allowing a preferred claim.102 But otherwise the situation would be one peculiarly within the province of the courts to adjust, charged as they are with taking all elements of the problem into account. On such analysis the "purchase" result reached by Justice Stone in the Rochling case is much to be preferred.
The same difference of opinion exists, however, in the insolvency cases as where other issues are presented.
The older view, proceeding upon the theory that the term "deposit" signifies a species of bailment, thus allowing of reclamation, has largely disappeared.103 Those courts regarding "charge back" as inconsistent with purchase, however, as might be expected, give pre- 105 In re Jarmulowsky, supra note 82.
